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FORUM
JUDGING THE PRUDENCE OF
CONSTRUCTING NUCLEAR POWER




It is not too much to expect that our children will enjoy in
their homes electrical power too cheap to meter, will know of
great periodic regionalfamines in the world only as matters of
history, will travel effortlessly over the seas and under them and
through the air wi/h a minimum of danger and at great speeds,
and will experience a lfe span far longer than ours, as disease
yields and man comes to understand what causes him to age.
This is the forecast for an age ofpeace.
Lewis Strauss**
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 1978, Congress passed the National Energy Act
of 1978, one part of which is the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA).' PURPA establishes six federal electric utility ratemaking
standards2 which are designed to promote lower electric generation
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of the National Energy Law and
Policy Institute, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., The University of Tulsa; J.D., The
University of Tulsa College of Law; LL.M., Columbia University.
** W. LAURENCE, MEN AND ATOMS 245 (1955).
I. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117-73 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42, 43 U.S.C.) (1978).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d) (codifying § 11 l(d) of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act).
(d) ESTABLISHMENT.-The following Federal standards are hereby established:
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costs and economic efficiency by ensuring that electric utility rates ac-
curately reflect the costs of providing electric utility services. PUR-PA
requires that each state decide within three years of PURPA's enact-
ment whether to adopt the six federal electric utility ratemaking stan-
dards.' In order to understand fully the issues it should consider in
deciding whether to adopt PURPA's electric utility ratemaking stan-
dards, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the Commission)
awarded a grant to this author for a legal and regulatory analysis of
PURPA's applicability to Oklahoma's utility regulation practices.
PURPA does not directly concern the issues of whether nuclear
power plants should be built, and how states should regulate utility
construction programs. There is, however, a direct connection between
the costs of a utility's service and the electric utility system produced by
its construction programs. To promote economic efficiency, a prime
PURPA goal, utility rates must not only reflect accurately the utility's
costs of service, but also encourage consumption behavior which is ap-
(1) COST OF SERVIcE.-Rates charged by any electric utility for providing
electric service to each class of electric consumers shall be designed, to the maxi-
mum extent practicable, to reflect the costs of providing electric service to such class,
as determined under section 2625(a) of this title.
(2) DECLINING BLOCK RATES.-The energy component of a rate, or the
amount attributable to the energy component in a rate, charged by any electric util-
ity for providing electric service during any period to any class of electric consumers
may not decrease as kilowatt-hour consumption by such class increases during such
period except to the extent that such utility demonstrates that the costs to such utility
of providing electric service to such class, which costs are attributable to such energy
component, decrease as such consumption increases during such period.
(3) TIME-oF-DAY RATEs.-The rates charged by any electric utility for pro-
viding electric service to each class of electric consumers shall be on a time-of-day
basis which reflects the costs of providing electric service to such class of electric
consumers at different times of the day unless such rates are not cost effective with
respect to such class, as determined under section 2625(b) of this title.
(4) SEASONAL RATEs.-The rates charged by an electric utility for providing
electric service to each class of electric consumers shall be on a seasonal basis which
reflects the costs of providing service to such class of consumers at different seasons
of the year to the extent that such costs vary seasonally for such utility.
(5) INTERRUPrIBLE RATE.-Each electric utility shall offer each industrial
and commercial electric consumer an interruptible rate which reflects the cost of
providing interruptible service to the class of which such consumer is a member.
(6) LOAD MANAGEMENr TECHNIQUES.-Each electric utility shall offer to its
electric consumers such load management techniques as the State regulatory author-
ity (or the nonregulated electric utility) has determined will-
(A) be practicable and cost-effective, as determined under section 2625(c)
of this title,
(B) be reliable, and
(C) provide useful energy or capacity management advantages to the
electric utility.
id
3. 16 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(2) (codifying § I12(b)(2) of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act).
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss2/5
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
propriate to the relationship between projected consumer demands for
electricity and the utility's capacity to meet those demands. A utility
facing excess capacity should adopt policies toward ratemaking and
construction regulation which differ from those of a utility facing ca-
pacity shortages.' Also, as will be demonstrated below, nuclear power
plants involve cost of service factors different from those of other types
of plants. Wishing to acquire more knowledge of the methods of evalu-
ating the prudence of constructing nuclear plants, and to develop
mechanisms for encouraging electric utilities to tailor their construction
programs to fit the needs of its consumers, the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission requested the author to cover these matters in his analy-
sis.5 Here follows the Allison report to the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission.
State Public Utility Commissions (PUC's) can influence the course
of nuclear development within their states only through their authority
to protect consumers from bearing expenses resulting from imprudent
utility investments, since health and safety issues are under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).6 This
report contains (1) an outline of economic issues relevant to determin-
ing whether a nuclear power plant is a prudent investment, (II) a gen-
eral discussion of the scope of a PUC's authority to protect ratepayers
from bearing the expenses resulting from imprudent utility invest-
ments, and (III) a discussion of whether Oklahoma's statutory proce-
dure for regulating the issuance of utility securities can be used by the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission to shield Oklahoma ratepayers
from imprudent utility investments.
II. ARE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS PRUDENT INVESTMENTS?
The evidence is hopelessly conflicting as to whether nuclear plants
4. For example, utilities facing excess capacity may want to defer the adoption of rate prac-
tices, such as time-of-day rates, interruptible rates, and load management programs, which retard
the growth of consumer demands so that their existing capacity may be fully employed as soon as
possible.
5. [Ed.] For additional issues, see generally A. MURPHY, THE LICENSING OF POWER PLANTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1978); Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear
Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978); Murray, The Economics of Electric Power
Generation-1975-2000, in THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY 55 (A. Murphy ed. 1976); and
Environmental Policy Institute, Reasons for Delay in Powerplant Licensing and Construction
(Mar. 1978).
6. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146-54 (8th Cir. 1971), a/'d
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
[Vol. 15:262
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are better investments than other types of power plants,7 particularly
since each proposed project must be judged on its own merits. Certain
issues, however, must be examined in judging the prudence of a pro-
posed nuclear plant, including capital costs in relation to demand for
electricity, fuel costs, the plant's projected operational reliability,
"crud" clean-up costs, 8 expended fuel disposal costs,9 decommissioning
costs, 10 and the power plant's exposure to liability for injuries to per-
sons or property resulting from a nuclear accident.
A. Capital Cost Issues
Nuclear power plants are baseload plants." Baseload power
7. A recent Congressional study revealed a myriad of conflicting opinions as to whether
nuclear power plants were more efficient than other types of power plants. HOUSE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, H.R. REP. No. 95-1090, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR POWER COSTS]. The views of those participating in the
Committee's hearings can be summarized as follows: The critics of nuclear development who
appeared before the subcommittee generally testified that regulation of plant design, construction,
operation, and fuel cycle will continue to affect nuclear plants more adversely than coal plants;
nuclear construction costs will continue to increase faster than the inflation rate (though perhaps
not as fast as in the early 1970's) and faster than coal costs; and that large nuclear plants will
continue to perform less efficiently than medium sized coal plants, adding to reserve requirements
and leading to replacement energy costs which will erase many of the advantages of cheaper
nuclear fuel.
Supporters of nuclear development generally concluded that new regulations will decrease
for nuclear but increase for coal both in mining and plant pollution control requirements; nuclear
construction costs will be brought under control and will be only slightly higher than coal con-
struction costs; and that the performance of large nuclear plants will soon improve as the industry
accumulates more experience with such units.
The Wisconsin Public Service Commission stated that whether one believed that nuclear
power plants were more efficient than coal-fired power plants depended upon the general eco-
nomic assumptions one holds about the world's energy future. The Commission then found that
under the assumptions they believed applicable to Wisconsin, nuclear power plants were more
costly than coal given present uncertainties as to fuel, decommissioning, and waste disposal costs.
Advance Plans for Construction, Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. 05-EP-1, at 15 (Aug. 17, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Advance Plans for Construction].
8. "'Crud,' as it is referred to by nuclear engineers, consists of metal oxides which become
radioactive in the cooling water and accumulate on the insides of reactor piping like rust on ordi-
nary iron pipes .. " NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 25.
9. Expended fuel disposal costs refer to the costs of storing or reprocessing spent fuel. See
notes 68-76 infra and accompanying text.
10. Decommissioning costs are those which a utility incurs in order to discontinue safely the
operation of a nuclear power plant that has reached the end of its useful life. See notes 77-88 infra
and accompanying text.
11. There are three basic types of power plants within a utility's electric generation system:
baseload, intermediate, and peaking. Baseload power plants are large, complex power plants
designed to operate at maximum capacity. Intermediate power plants are designed for variable
use, operating at maximum capacity for most of the day, but capable of being operated economi-
cally at lower levels. Peaking units are designed to be operated during the few hours each day in
which the utility faces peak demands. These units have quick start-up and shut-down times, en-
abling them to provide flexible responses to fluctuating consumer demands. Baseload power
plants have the highest capital costs and the lowest operating costs when they operate at maximum
4
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plants are characterized as capital-intensive but fuel efficient in com-
parison to smaller size power plants. 12 Nuclear plants are also more
capital-intensive than those fired by alternative fuels. 13 This capital-
intensive characteristic makes baseload nuclear power plants attractive
to utilities since their return on capital increases with the size of their
rate bases. 4 In order to protect ratepayers from imprudent investments
in baseload nuclear plants, PUC's must develop a policy and procedu-
ral framework which permit them to determine in a timely fashion
whether baseload nuclear power plants are economically desirable ad-
ditions to the utility systems such PUC's regulate.
Because nuclear plants are baseload by nature, their economic de-
sirability rests with the desirability of baseload power plants in general.
Baseload plants are economical only if they can operate almost contin-
uously throughout their useful lives, 5 so that their annual productions
of electricity are large enough to result in acceptable levels of capital
costs per kilowatt-hour. Otherwise, the baseload power plant will be
uncompetitive with smaller power plants because its higher capital cost
per unit will offset its lower per unit operating costs advantage.' 6 A
prerequisite, therefore, to a determination that a baseload plant is eco-
nomically viable is a proper relationship between its maximum capac-
ity' 7 and projected demands on the utility system over the power
plant's useful life. After this relationship is found to be proper, two
additional problems must be considered. First, baseload plants in-
capacity. Peaking units have the lowest capital costs, but are not very efficient users of premium
fuels, and therefore have the highest operating costs. See Wis. PuB. SERV. COMM'N, GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY TARIFFS, Doc. No. I-AC-10, at 10
(1977) [hereinafter cited as WISCONSIN GENERIC STATEMENT]; TEX. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, RATE
DESIGN STUDY: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 7-8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TEXAS PRELIMINARY
STUDY].
12. Northern States Power Co., Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. CA-5447, at 5 n.1 (Mar. 6,
1979). See NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, stupra note 2, at 71, 75.
13. NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, sUpra note 7, at 28.
14. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON.
REV. 1052 (1962). See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITU-
TIONS 47-59 (1971).
15. See NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 26-28.
16. Id.
17. Each power plant's electrical generating capacity is expressed in terms of the largest de-
mand for electricity it can accommodate. Demand is the rate at which electric energy is produced
by a generating unit, usually expressed in terms of kilowatts (kW). WISCONSIN GENERIC STATE-
MENT, supra note 11, at 300. The unit of output referred to throughout this report is the kilowatt-
hour which is "the basic unit of electric energy equal to one kilowatt of power supplied to or taken
from an electric circuit steadily for one hour." Id. at 303.
[Vol. 15:262
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crease the system's reserve capacity requirements;18 and second,
baseload plants, especially nuclear plants, require so much construction
time, that utilities have difficulty in financing them without contribu-
tions from ratepayers in the form of Construction Work in Progress
(CWIP).19
1. The Demand Prerequisite
Because of their capital-intensive nature, baseload plants must op-
erate almost continuously in order to reduce their capital costs per kilo-
watt-hour to an economically acceptable level." A baseload plant
should not be built unless it can be projected that its maximum capac-
ity will be substantially equal to the constant demands on the utility
system to which it belongs.2 Even where the relationship between a
utility system's constant demand and the maximum capacity of the pro-
posed baseload plant is favorable, the baseload plant should not be
built if its addition and operation will reduce the operating lives and
periods of other power plants in the system so as to lower the efficiency
of the system's overall generation mix. 22 In other words, what must be
avoided at all costs is the creation of excess capacity, which forces the
utility to use its generating equipment improperly in order to minimize
the costs of idle equipment.
To ensure that the addition of a baseload power plant does not
create excess capacity, utilities and PUC's must calculate the system's
projected peak demands and load factors over the powerplant's useful
life." If a system's projected peak demand or load factor is low, its
constant demand may be too low to justify a baseload plant, and a
greater percentage of peaking or intermediate load power plants may
18. Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 13-14; NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra
note 7, at 29-30.
19. NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 36; see note 42 infra and accompanying text.
20. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
21. See NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 33-36; id. at 133 (Reps. Kindness, Horton,
Erlenborn, Wydler, Brown, McCloskey, Corcoran, Quagle, Walker, Strangeland, and Cunning-
ham, dissenting).
22. The utility's generation mix is its total configuration of power plants-baseload, interme-
diate, and peaking.
23. A system's peak demand is the level of electric energy, expressed in kilowatts, the system
must generate at the moment when the sum of its customers' demand for electricity is the highest.
See WISCONSIN GENERIC STATEMENT, supra note 11, at 300. A system's load factor is the ratio of
the average demand supplied by the system to the peak demand imposed on the system during a
specified time period. Id. at 303. The load factor is calculated by dividing the total number of
kilowatt-hours produced during the time period by the product of the system's peak demand times
the total number of hours in the time period. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, ELECTRIC UTILITY COST ALLOCATION MANUAL, App. A (1973).
1979]
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provide a more economical generation mix.24 In this regard, the cur-
rent generating mix of the system must be carefully weighed against
projected system demands and load factors to avoid prematurely scrap-
ping a power plant or reassigning it from the base period to the peak or
intermediate periods.25
In order to forecast accurately future system demands and load
factors, projections must take into account changing price levels, tariff
structures, and availability of fuels. This requires a quantification of
the effects on future load growth of conservation efforts, use of load
management techniques, conversion from natural gas to coal, rede-
signed rate structures, and improvements in end-use efficiency.2 6
A variety of conservation efforts, voluntary and involuntary, have
appeared since the 1973 Arab oil embargo. The National Energy Act
mandates still more conservation efforts. 27 Load management tech-
niques which have the potential of increasing load factors by putting a
cap on peak period usage are becoming available to consumers. These
methods include interruptible tariffs, s residential water heater control,
and control of residential and commercial air conditioning.2 9 These
efforts have retarded the rate of demand growth and will continue to do
so in the future.
A shift from power plants fired by natural gas riiay significantly
affect electric utilities in Oklahoma, which historically has had over
ninety percent of its generating system powered by natural gas. 0 If the
24. See notes 8, 11, 12 supra and accompanying text.
25. Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 1-7, 15, 22; id. at 34-35 (Chairman
Cicchetti, concurring).
26. Id. at 11.
27. For example, the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619,
92 Stat. 3206-89 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 23, 42 U.S.C.) (1978), provides for plans
and incentives designed to promote increased use of residential energy conservation measures,
weatherization of homes and public buildings, and increased use of solar energy. The Act also
provides for establishing energy efficiency standards for automobiles and other consumer prod-
ucts. The Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-918, 92 Stat. 3174-3205 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.) provides tax incentives for residential energy conservation, bus usage, van
pooling, use of certain alcohol fuels, business conservation of, or conversion from, oil and gas, and
developing new energy technologies.
28. An interruptible tariff is a rate schedule which is lower than the general rate level and is
offered to customers who are willing to have all or part of their electrical service curtailed in the
event the utility's peak demands are threatening to exceed its generating capacity. See TEXAS
PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 11, at 64.
29. Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 11-12.
30. This figure was compiled from the information contained in 1978 FERC Form No. I
filings of Public Service Company of Oklahoma and Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company, at 209.
[Vol. 15:262
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Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act3 causes Oklahoma utilities to
begin building coal and nuclear plants before their gas power plants
have reached the end of their useful lives, Oklahoma will experience
temporarily a projected overcapacity unrelated to demand growth.
Building baseload power plants, therefore, should not necessarily be
discouraged.32 This projected overcapacity will also increase the per
unit cost of electricity, because the utilities' rate bases will include the
undepreciated investment in natural gas power plants plus the capital
costs of the replacement power plants.
In the near future, electric rate structures in Oklahoma may be
redesigned to track more closely the costs of providing electric service.
This should slow the rate of growth of electricity demand, especially if
time-of-use pricing, interruptible rates, and tariffs designed to en-
courage load management and alternative energy sources are
adopted.33 Yet, it has been suggested that such measures could in-
crease total energy use without significantly reducing system peak de-
mands, a circumstance that would favor building baseload power
31. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, § 201, 92 Stat.
3298, provides that:
Except to such extent as may be authorized under subtitle B-
(I) natural gas or petroleum shall not be used as a primary energy source in any
new electric powerplant; and
(2) no new electric powerplant may be constructed without the capability to use
coal or any other alternate fuel as a primary energy source.
Whether the effect of this provision will be dislocations among Oklahoma utilities is debatable,
since subtitle B of the Act riddles § 201 with temporary and permanent exemptions. Among the
permanent exemptions are those for (1) a lack of alternate fuel supply, id. at § 212(a)(l)A, 92 Stat.
3301; (2) site limitations affecting the use of coal, id. at § 212(a)(1)B, 92 Stat. 3301; (3) environ-
mental prohibitions on the use of coal, id. at § 212(a)(1)C, 92 Stat. 3301; (4) inability to finance a
coal-fired plant, id. at § 212(a)(l)D, 92 Stat. 3301; (5) infeasibility arising from state and local
requirements, id. at § 212(b), 92 Stat. 3301; (6) a demonstration that coal or alternative fuels
would not permit the installation of an efficient cogeneration facility, id. at § 212(c); (7) a demon-
stration that a facility must use a fuel mixture containing petroleum or natural gas to maintain
plant reliability, id. at § 212(d), 92 Stat. 3302; (8) a demonstration that the plant will be used solely
for emergency purposes, id. at § 212(e), 92 Stat. 3302; (9) a demonstration that the plant is needed
to maintain service reliability, id. at § 212(f), 92 Stat. 3302; (10) a demonstration that the plant will
be operated solely as a peakload generator, and for natural gas use, a showing that the plant
otherwise will not meet national ambient air quality standards, id. at § 212(g), 92 Stat. 3302; (11) a
demonstration that the plant will be used solely as an intermediate load powerplant and that the
plant is necessary to comply with national ambient air quality standards, id. at § 212(h), 92 Stat.
3303; and (12) a demonstration that the plant is necessary to meet scheduled equipment outages.
id. at § 212(j), 92 Stat. 3304.
32. See TExAs PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION, INTERIM REPORT: RATE DESIGN STUDY 15,
68 (1978). If the result of the Congressionally mandated conversion is to be an optimum replace-
ment system, there may be a justifiably temporary over-capacity resulting from the construction of
nuclear or coal-fired baseload generators before the present gas-fired generators have reached the
end of their useful lives.
33. Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 11-12.
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plants.34 End-use efficiency will also retard the growth of electricity
demands. Conservation policies, appliance performance standards,
and building codes will be modified to produce reductions in electricity
usage.
Because these factors will produce effects which are difficult to pre-
dict, utilities and state PUC's must periodically review system genera-
tion construction plans. In Wisconsin, for example, it was discovered
that the proposed new generation capacity contained in one utility's
system generation construction plan had to be revised downward thirty
to forty percent because of the effects of various demand reducing
measures which had been implemented by the Wisconsin Public Serv-
ice Commission.36
2. Reserve Capacity Requirements
Generally, the larger a power plant is, the greater the amount of
reserve capacity which must be provided to cover the periods of time
when its capacity is needed and it is not operational.37 This direct rela-
tionship between plant size and the amount of associated reserve ca-
pacity is a function of size, probability, and reliability.
Size determines the total amount of capacity subject to outage for
which reserve capacity must be available. This is obvious since more
reserve capacity must be brought on line to cover for a 2,000 megawatts
(mw) facility than to cover for an 800 mw facility.
Probability theory determines the chance that a given amount of
capacity will be non-operational for a particular time period. If three
smaller power plants are built to equal the capacity of one large plant,
the probability of losing temporarily the entire capacity is much greater
with one large plant than when there are three smaller plants, even if
all four power plants are equally reliable.38 This is especially true since
every plant is periodically shut down for maintenance.
34. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. 6630-ER-2, at 21 (July 20,
1978) (views expressed by Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc.).
35. Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 12.
36. The Wisconsin Public Service Commission noted that under its new forecasts "[tlhis
range of capacity would require the authorization and construction of between approximately
1600 mw and 2300 mw of generating capacity not already constructed or authorized. These
amounts contrast with 3130 mw most recently proposed in the advance plan." Id. at 6.
37. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
38. Id. at 12-13. Note also, that if there is a 50 percent chance of an outage at any given
moment for each plant, the chances that all three of the smaller plants would go out at the same
time are four times smaller than the chances that the one larger plant would go out.
[Vol. 15:262
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Finally, there is the question of operational reliability. The evi-
dence is contradictory as to whether a coal plant is more reliable than a
nuclear plant. Proponents of each technology have produced evidence
that their competitors are less reliable.39 There also seems to be credi-
ble evidence that the reliability factor is about the same for both tech-
nologies.' All sides agree that large plants are less reliable than
smaller plants, whether the plant is coal-fired or nuclear-fired.41
That baseload power plants impose greater reserve requirements
on utility systems than do smaller plants is an inescapable conclusion.
The question remains whether the greater reserve capacity requirement
associated with baseload nuclear plants imposes so much in additional
costs on utility systems that nuclear power plants are uncompetitive
generators of electricity.
3. Construction Work in Progress
Baseload plants involve such enormous capital costs and lead
times between planning and financing them and putting them into op-
eration, that they increase the chances that the building utility will have
to petition the PUC for Construction Work in Progress. 2 CWIP allows
utilities to add to the rate base those sums expended for constructing
utility facilities as they are incurred, rather than wait until the facilities
being constructed are completed and put into operation.43 CWIP is
sometimes labeled an unfair charge to current ratepayers because it
forces them to pay for electric production before it is supplied to
them." Obviously, some ratepayers will never benefit from the output
of the new facilities. Yet, CWIP is not necessarily unfair to current
ratepayers since arguably they create the demands on the utility system
which produce the need for new utility facilities.45
4. Summary
Nuclear power plants are baseload facilities which have higher
39. NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 27-28.
40. Id. at 113 (Rep. Wydler, dissenting).
41. Id. at 27. See EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, REPORT ON THE EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY
FOR THE 10 YEAR PERIOD 1967-1976 cited in NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 113 (Rep.
Wydler, dissenting).
42. NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 36.
43. Id;see Wisconsin Elec. Co., Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. CA-5491, at 6 (Mar. 2,
1979).
44. NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 36.
45. Id; see Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 43, at 6.
1979]
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss2/5
TULSA LAW JOURVAL
capital costs than smaller power plants and baseload plants fired by
alternative fuel sources. If, however, the proper conditions are present,
the lower fuel costs of baseload nuclear plants may offset enough of
their higher capital costs to make them the cheapest generators of elec-
tricity. In determining whether the proper conditions are present, state
PUC's must consider:
a. whether throughout its useful life, the maximum capacity
of the proposed baseload nuclear power plant approximates
the firm demand that will be placed on the system it will
serve;
b. whether, given the utility system's current generation mix,
an addition of a baseload nuclear plant will prematurely re-
place or reduce the operation of existing plants and lower the
efficiency of the system;
c. the effects on future system demands and load factors of
energy conservation efforts, shift from power plants fired by
natural gas, load management programs, changes in rate
structures, and improved end-use efficiency;
d. whether periodic review of these factors require a revision
in the utility system's generation expansion plans;
e. whether adding a baseload nuclear power plant to the
utility system will increase its required reserve capacity to un-
economic levels; and
f. whether adding a baseload nuclear power plant to the
utility system will force the state PUC to grant Construction
Work in Progress.
B. Fuel Costs
Throughout the operating history of baseload nuclear power
plants their fuel costs have been much lower than those of other types
of plants. This advantage has sufficiently offset their higher capital
costs, making them the least costly generators of electricity.46 Today,
rising costs of uranium and governmental inaction on the issues of fuel
reprocessing and breeder reactor technology make questionable
whether baseload nuclear plants will maintain this superiority over
other types of power plants.
The price of uranium increased 500 to 700 percent from 1973 to
46. See NUCLEAR POWER CosTS, supra note 7, at 32; id. at 134 (Reps. Kindness, Horton,
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1978.47 There is also a supply problem developing. Domestic reserves
will not provide enough uranium to power the nuclear plants commit-
ted to as of 1975 throughout their useful lives. 8 If domestic consumers
of uranium are forced to import uranium, much higher prices can be
expected because a Uranium Producers Export Cartel (UPEC) has al-
ready formed.4 9 The Wisconsin Public Service Commission has be-
come so concerned over the uncertain outlook for uranium prices and
nuclear fuel availability that it has imposed a moratorium on future
construction of nuclear power plants in Wisconsin.5
Nuclear fuel cost projections cannot be judged in a vacuum.
While supply and pricing problems confront the nuclear industry, coal,
its chief competitor, is not without its own problems. From 1973 to
1978, coal prices increased by only six percent;51 but since 1978 coal
prices have escalated because of the combined effects of labor wage
demands and more stringent mining safety and environmental regula-
tions. 2 Coal transportation, which requires large investments in coal
47. The price of uranium has risen from $6 to $8 per pound in 1973 to $40 per pound in 1978.
NUCLEAR POWER CosTS, supra note 7, at 32.
48. NUCLEAR POWER CosTS, supra note 7, at 32-33.
49. Id.
50. See generally Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 16-18, 27. Specifically the
Commission stated:
The nuclear fuel issue of supply/demand imbalances is influenced by federal policies,
which affect mining, milling, enrichment, reprocessing, the breeder, federal uranium re-
quirements (military), growth in generating capacity, environmental constraints, and the
availability of domestic and foreign uranium. Uncertainties exist in each factor;, how-
ever, the record elearly indicates that the net effect couldtendto increase theprice ofnuclear
fuel.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added). The Commission finally concluded that "the uncertainties at this time
as to supply of nuclear fuel at a reasonable cost, together with other uncertainties named herein,
are serious enough to militate against committing this state during this period of uncertainty to
amounts of new nuclear capacity beyond that approved herein for planning purposes." Id. at 18.
In his concurring opinion, Chairman Cicchetti stated:
What tilted my decision to join my colleagues in banning new nuclear applications in
Wisconsin until the federal government resolves nuclear fuel availability, waste disposal
and decommissioning is two and a half decades of broken federal promises and a desire
to avoid economic catastrophe if the federal government continues to promote nuclear
energy with unnecessary siting laws, unrealistically strong endorsements and its own in-
credible inaction. I am pleased that Wisconsin now joins California, Iowa and Maine in
laying the nuclear burden upon Washington, where it has belonged for almost three
decades.
Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
51. NUCLEAR POWER Cos-rs, supra note 7, at 32.
52. Id. at 104 (Minority views of Reps. Horton, Erlenborn, Wydler, C. Brown, McCloskey,
G. Brown, Thone, Kasten, Kindness, Corcoran, Quayle, Walker, Strangeland, and Cunningham).
In Wisconsin, Commissioner Oestreicher, dissenting to a denial of an application to construct the
proposed Tyrone nuclear powerplant, commented:
If the coal alternative is proposed at this site the same good folks will just as earnestly
remind us of coal related problems. Sulphur and nitrate emissions and the greenhouse
12
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hopper cars, sophisticated loading and unloading equipment, and stor-
age facilities, is scarcely cheap. 3
In summary, fuel costs are rising for all energy sources. The criti-
cal inquiries concerning nuclear power plants therefore are: Whether
uranium prices are rising so much faster than the prices of alternative
fuels that nuclear plants can no longer offset enough of their higher
capital costs with their lower fuel costs to remain competitive; and
whether the fuel supply availability is better for nuclear plants than for
other types of plants. In this regard, a reversal of the federal govern-
ment's negative attitude towards fuel reprocessing and breeder reactors
would dramatically improve the nuclear fuel supply outlook.
C. Operational Reliability
A power plant's reliability is measured by its capacity factor,
which is the ratio of the plant's actual annual production to the produc-
tion it would have achieved had it operated all year at full capacity. 54
The evidence is inconclusive as to whether coal-fired plants are more
reliable than nuclear power plants. 5 There is common agreement,
however, that larger power plants are less reliable than smaller plants. 6
effect for starters; trace emissions, including arsenic, lead, mercury and radioactivity are
there too; and most difficult are the solid waste disposal problems. Change the site and
many of the principals change but not the arguments or the agents or the attorneys.
Northern States Power Co., supra note 12, at 47.
53. Transportation is a major component of coal costs. See THE SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY PROGRAM, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHoMA, ENERGY ALTERNATIVES: A COMPARATIVE ANALY-
sis 1-129 (1975); RIEBER, So & STUKEL, THE COAL FUTURE: ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOOICAL
ANALYSIS OF INITIATIVES AND INNOVATIONS TO SECURE FUEL SUPPLY INDEPENDENCE, CENTER
FOR ADVANCED COMPUTATION DOC. No. 163 at IV-l (1975). Employing unit trains will help
reduce this cost. RIBBER at IV-4. Utilities may also have to invest in the necessary loading and
unloading facilities. General Research Corp. and International Research and Technology Corp.,
Task Report I" A Study of the Competitive and Economic Impact Associated With Coal Slurry
P#feline Implementation, 17, in TASK REPORTS: COAL SLURRY PIPELINES (Office of Technology
Assessment 1978).
54. NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 26.
55. The Committee hearings from which the Nuclear Power Costs report was prepared pro-
duced a range of opinions concerning whether nuclear power plants were more reliable than coal.
One witness testified that the average capacity factor for large nuclear plants was 55 percent as
compared with the 70 percent capacity factors of coal plants with scrubbers. Another witness
testified that large nuclear power plants had capacity factors approximately 63.6 percent, while the
capacity factors of large coal plants ranged from 49.2 percent to 56.4 percent. NUCLEAR POWER
COSTS, supra note 7, at 27. A dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Power Costs report cited figures
from the Energy Research Development Administration (ERDA) and the Federal Power Com-
mission (FPC) which indicated that in. 1976 nuclear baseload powerplants had a net capacity
factor of 59.7 percent as compared to the 56.4 net capacity factor of coal baseload plants. NU-
CLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 133 (Reps. Kindness, Horton, Erlenhorn, Wydler, Brown,
McCloskey, Corcoran, Quayle, Walker, Strangeland, and Cunningham, dissenting).
56: NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 27. See EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, REPORT
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Reliability is not only important for determining the level of reserve
capacity costs, but also for determining whether nuclear plants will
have enough output to offset their high capital costs. 57 Whether rate-
payers must bear increased fuel costs in the form of replacement power,
which generally is more expensive than self-generated power and is di-
rectly charged to the ratepayers through automatic purchased power
clauses, is also evaluated in terms of reliability.58
A related concept is the availability factor, which is a higher figure
than the capacity factor because it measures the amount of time a plant
is operational, not just the amount of time it is actually in service.
Thus, a power plant is not penalized for times when it was not in serv-
ice solely because of a managerial decision not to operate it.5 9 Where a
power plant's availability factor is significantly higher than its capacity
factor, it is likely that the utility system as a whole has a low load factor
or a peak demand significantly higher than normal demand, which
could make the addition of a baseload nuclear reactor uneconomical.6 0
Reliability can drastically affect the economics of capital-intensive
nuclear power plants. Therefore, it is important that state PUC's make
careful comparisons of the capacity factors of each type of plant before
allowing a capital-intensive plant to be added to a utility system.
PUC's should also determine whether the utility has made contingent
fuel purchase arrangements in case power must be acquired to replace
that lost as a result of a power plant outage, and what costs will be
borne by the ratepayers under the terms of the utility's purchased
power arrangements and purchased power clauses.
D. "Crud" Clean-Up,
Cleaning up "crud" is the process of removing radioactive metal
ON THE EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY FOR THE 10 YEAR PERIOD 1967-1976 cited in NUCLEAR
POWER COSTS, id. at 113 (Rep. Wydler, dissenting).
57. It has been estimated that for a power plant costing $1,000 per kilowatt to construct,
capital costs per kilowatt-hour will increase from 2.8 cents per kilowatt-hour to 3.7 cents per kilo-
watt-hour as its projected lifetime capacity factor decreases from 63 percent to 50 percent. Nu-
CLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 26.
58. For example, New York's Consolidated Edison customers were asked to pick up a $23
million surcharge for replacement fuel when one of its plants shut down for six months in 1976.
The Brown's Ferry nuclear accident shut the plant down for 17 months at a cost of $240 million to
Tennessee Valley Authority customers. NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 28. The Three
Mile Island accident may cause the ratepayers' bills to increase 20 percent because of the costs of
clean-up and replacement power. Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
59. NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 133 (Reps. Kindness, Horton, Erlenhorn, Wyd-
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oxides from the cooling systems of nuclear power plants. 6t The pur-
pose of the process is to reduce the exposure of maintenance workers to
radioactive materials so as to speed up maintenance procedures.62 In
many plants now in operation, the "crud" clean-up will have to occur
about half-way through their useful lives at great expense to the util-
ity. 63 In one case, the cost of the clean-up was $36 million in 1978 for a
plant which cost $51 million to build in 19 60 .61 Taking inflation into
consideration, the "crud" cleansing process cost the utility in excess of
twenty percent of the plant's construction costs. 65
It has been pointed out that even though the cost of cleaning up
"crud" is great in absolute value, it has scant effect on the price of elec-
tricity.66 Also, design improvements over the years may have reduced
the need to conduct "crud" clean-ups in some power plants.67 Never-
theless, PUC's should determine whether a "crud" clean-up will be re-
quired in proposed nuclear power plants, and if so, what additional
costs will be imposed on ratepayers.
E. Expended Fuel Disposal Costs
The disposal of spent nuclear fuel presents a serious economic
problem to potential operators of nuclear power plants. The problem is
related to that of fuel availability in the sense that previous plans for
nuclear fuel reprocessing by commercial enterprise have not come to
fruition.68  Also, the Carter Administration has discouraged nuclear
fuel reprocessing out of concern that it could lead to nuclear prolifera-
tion.69 The end result has been a dramatic increase in the operating
costs of nuclear plants because the lack of reprocessing both decreases
61. Id. at 25.
62. Id. at 98 (minority views of Reps. Horton, Erlenborn, Wydler, C. Brown, McCloskey, G.
Brown, Thorne, Kasten, Kindness, Corcoran, Quayle, Walker, Strangeland, and Cunningham).
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id. at 26.
65. When the 1960 $51 million construction cost is converted into 1978 dollars, the $36 mil-
lion in 1978 clean-up costs represents over twenty percent of the plant's original construction,
assuming an annual inflation rate of six percent from 1960 to 1978.
66. NUCLEAR POWER COSTS, supra note 7, at 26; id. at 97-98 (minority views of Reps. Hor-
ton, Erlenborn, Wydler, C. Brown, McCloskey, G. Brown, Thorne, Kasten, Kindness, Corcoran,
Quayle, Walker, Strangeland, and Cunningham).
67. Id. at 98. It has been "determined that the careful control of the primary coolant water
chemistry could deter crud formation. . . . [and] not only minimize the build up of crud but
actually [contribute] to its disollution, or return to solution". Id. at 113 (Rep. Wydler, dissenting),
68. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. 6630-ER-1 at 22-23 (Aug.
5, 1976) (Comm'r Holden, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
69. Statement by the President on Nuclear Power Policy, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
506-07 (Apr. 11, 1977).
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the supply of available fuel and increases the costs of fuel storage. Fuel
storage costs arise because spent fuel not converted into reusable nu-
clear fuel must be stored in facilities provided by the utility.70
Fuel storage costs also have increased dramatically as a result of
the inertia in the federal government's nuclear waste disposal program.
Specifically, the problem concerns identifying and acquiring perma-
nent sites at which nuclear wastes can be stored in a safe and environ-
mentally sound manner. Great debate has taken place over whether
any such place exists. The debate has resulted in slowed development
of appropriate nuclear waste storage sites, which has forced utilities to
expand their temporary nuclear waste storage facilities.7' These tem-
porary storage facilities have the potential of becoming perpetual bur-
dens to the states, since the radioactive waste continues to be hazardous
for periods of time which far outlive the existence of the company
which owns the site.72
Increased fuel storage costs created forty-five percent of the
needed revenue increase of Wisconsin Electric Power Companies
(WEPCO) in 1975, and fifty percent of its needed revenue increase in
1976. 71 These costs were anticipated neither by the Wisconsin Public
Service Commission, or evidently by WEPCO,74 although at least one
commissioner believed the utility was negligent in not providing for an
economical waste storage program and therefore should absorb these
surprise costs. 7 5 Uncertainty in the waste management area contrib-
uted heavily to Wisconsin's and Iowa's declarations of moratoria on
nuclear power plant construction until such time as federal policy is
clarified with respect to fuel reprocessing and nuclear waste disposal.76
70. Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 19.
71. See id. at 18-19; NUCLEAR POWER CosTS, supra note 7, at 8-15.
72. See Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 18-19.
73. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. 6630-ER-1, at 14 (Sept.
15, 1975); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 68, at 24.
74. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 68, at 23.
75. Commissioner Holden stated his belief as follows:
[T]hese fuel costs now being experienced reflect decisions by the company and assur-
ances given to the Commission by the company which are turning out not to be valid in
practice. These are decisions and assurances where, on the view taken here, the burden
must be assumed by management and by the shareholders of the company rather than
by the ratepayers. . . . It is a violation of the cost-of-service principle to assign the extra
costs (due to shortage) to the ratepayers. For if we do that, then we have adopted the
principle that any bill paid is a valid "cost," even if the bill ("cost") results from avoida-
ble error on the part of management.
Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
76. See NUCLEAR POWER CosTs, supra note 7, at 22-23; Advance Plans for Construction,
supra note 7, at 27; Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 43, at 4.
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To avoid surprises similar to that which WEPCO suffered, state
PUC's should require utilities to declare in advance their plans for nu-
clear waste disposal and what these plans will cost the ratepayer. Such
an advance declaration will allow PUC's to judge at the outset whether
a proposed nuclear plant is a prudent investment. The utility's declara-
tions can be used as a standard against which to measure subsequent
nuclear waste disposal experience. Where subsequent experience de-
parts drastically from the utility's expectations, state PUC's may be jus-
tified in forcing the shareholders to bear any surprise increases in
nuclear waste disposal expenses.
F. Decommissioning Costs
1. Decommissioning Methods
Nuclear power plants must be decommissioned at the end of their
useful lives. Depending on the method used, the cost of decommission-
ing a power plant ranges from three to fifteen percent of the power
plant's original capital cost in constant dollars.77 The methods of
decommissioning nuclear plants are mothballing, entombing, and dis-
mantling.
Mothballing is the cheapest method of decommissioning a power-
plant.78 This process involves:
removing all fuel and radioactive fluids and wastes and put-
ting the facility in protective storage. Adequate radiation
monitoring, environmental surveillance, and appropriate se-
curity procedures must be established to ensure public health
and safety.7 9
Entombment is a refinement of mothballing. All fuel assemblies,
radioactive fluids, and wastes are removed, and selected components
are shipped offsite. Remaining radioactive or contaminated compo-
nents of the facility are sealed in a structure possessing a biological
shield. Continuous security is required to assure health and safety.80
Dismantling is the most expensive decommissioning option.8" All
on-site materials having contamination levels above acceptable levels
77. NUCLEAR POWER CosTs, supra note 7, at 22-23.
78. Id. at 97 (minority views of Reps. Horton, Erlenborn, Wydler, C. Brown, McCloskey, G.
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must be removed and stored elsewhere.82
2. Selecting the Optimum Decommissioning Strategy
Choosing a decommissioning strategy should be based on criteria
in addition to the mere cost of the particular method. Although
mothballing and entombment are cheaper than dismantling, they re-
quire the provision of perpetual monitoring to ensure public health and
safety. 3 It is questionable whether a private utility company can guar-
antee that it will always be in existence to provide the necessary secur-
ity, which creates a risk that taxpayers will ultimately have to bear this
burden.84
The costs of mothballing and entombment may be underesti-
mated, since neither method will permit the plant site to be used imme-
diately for subsequent operations.8 5 Plant sites are prime areas, so the
true costs of mothballing and entombment must reflect the loss of op-
portunity costs resulting from not being able immediately to construct a
new power plant on the decommissioned plant site.86
The optimum decommissioning strategy may involve a combina-
tion of these procedures. If the opportunity costs of not using the
decommissioned plant site are insignificant, savings may be had by
mothballing or entombing the site long enough to lower its contamina-
tion levels in order to use less expensive dismantling procedures. 87
82. The Atomic Energy Commission, the functions of which have been transferred to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), has set allowable levels of radioactive concentrations
found in air and water effluents for over 250 radionuclides. 10 C.F.R. § 20, App. B, Table II. The
NRC has not yet found it possible to set allowable contamination levels for residual and contami-
nation found on structures, equipment, and soils. It has, for the purposes of licensing nuclear
powerplants, constructed models to assess the radiological effect of residual contamination. 10
C.F.R. § 50, App. I. These models "simulate the release of radionuclides from operating facilities,
the environmental transport of the radionuclides, and the exposure or ingestion by man of these
radionuclides, which leads to an estimate of the radiological impact (presented as a dose) to a
hypothetical individual." Office of Standards Development, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Plan for Reevaluation of NRC Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, at 54. (Nureg-0436, Dec.
1978). Studies conducted at Battelle on generic facility decommissioning and a methodology for
determining acceptable levels of residual soil contamination proposed by the International Com-
mission on Radiological Protection may help to provide ways to set specific levels of residual
contamination. See id. at 55-6.
83. NUCLEAR POWER CosTs, supra note 7, at 97 (minority views of Reps. Horton, Erlenbor,
Wydler, C. Brown, McCloskey, G. Brown, Thone, Kasten, Kindness, Corcoran, Quayle, Walker,
Strangeland, and Cunningham).
84. See id. at 13.
85. Id. at 130 (Reps. Kindness, Horton, Erlenbom, Wydler, Brown, McCloskey, Corcoran,
Quayle, Walker, Strangeland, and Cunningham, dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 97 (minority view of Reps. Horton, Erlenborn, Wydler, C. Brown, McCloskey, G.
Brown, Thone, Kasten, Kindness, Corcoran, Quayle, Walker, Strangeland, and Cunningham).
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Lower contamination levels reduce dismantling costs because the proc-
ess can be carried out with less sophisticated safeguards and equipment
than those required to dismantle highly contaminated plants. 88
3. The Role of State PUC's
To ensure that utilities select the decommissioning strategy with
lowest cost yet consistent with public health and safety, and state utility
service goals, state PUC's must require that utilities proposing to build
nuclear power plants consider the costs and effectiveness of alternative
decommissioning strategies. This will give state PUC's an opportunity
to help shape the decommissioning strategy which is finally submitted
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for approval. More im-
portant, this submission requirement will give state PUC's a reference
point from which to judge the prudence of actual decommissioning ex-
penditures.
Once the estimated costs of the selected decommissioning strategy
are calculated, the state PUC must ensure that these costs are included
in the costs of the proposed nuclear plant when it is measured against
the costs of alternative powerplants. If the nuclear plant is approved
for construction, the PUC must then decide how the decommissioning
costs are to be financed.
In making this determination, the PUC must decide initially
whether current ratepayers or the ratepayers at the time decommission-
ing is to occur should bear the expense. Two attitudes prevail on this
topic. Some PUC's have ruled that decommissioning costs are too
speculative to be accepted as valid costs.8 9 The General Accounting
Office (GAO) and the State of Wisconsin believe that these costs should
be borne by those who presently benefit from nuclear generated elec-
tricity. 90 PUC's which adopt the GAO and Wisconsin approach must
quantify a specific amount to be set aside to cover future decommis-
sioning costs, and then adopt a procedure to reflect that amount in the
utility's rate levels.9
The GAO-Wisconsin attitude toward financing decommissioning
costs is the soundest economically. While decommissioning costs can-
not be quantified at a specific dollar figure, a reasonable range of esti-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 23.
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mates can be forecast. Failure to ask current consumers of nuclear
generated electricity to pay for all the costs of the power they use im-
poses the total decommissioning cost on future generations which will
never benefit from the power plant that created the expense. Moreover,
the total amount of decommissioning costs may be too large to be
borne in their entirety at the time they must be paid by either the utility
or its ratepayers. This could result in the taxpayers having to pay the
expenditures and/or abandone dismantling as a decommissioning al-
ternative which forecloses immediate future use of the plant site.
4. Summary
Every nuclear power plant will incur associated decommissioning
costs which must be considered by state PUC's in determining whether
a nuclear plant is a prudent investment. These costs amount to three to
fifteen percent of the nuclear plant's total capital costs on a constant
dollar basis.
The three decommissioning methods are mothballing, entomb-
ment, and dismantling. Mothballing and entombment are less expen-
sive than dismantling, but require the provision of perpetual security
measures and leave the plant site unavailable for immediate use. The
optimum decommissioning strategy may involve scheduling the se-
quential use of each decommissioning strategy, culminating with dis-
mantling.
In conducting cost/benefit analyses of alternative power plants to
determine whether a nuclear plant is a prudent investment, state PUC's
must be certain the estimated costs of constructing and operating a nu-
clear power plant reflect decommissioning costs.
State PUC's should require utilities proposing to build nuclear
power plants to submit a list of several decommissioning strategies and
their estimated costs in order to ensure that the lowest cost decommis-
sioning strategy consistent with public health and safety and state util-
ity service goals is submitted to the NRC for approval. This
submission will also provide the state PUC's with guideposts against
which to measure the actual decommissioning costs, when incurred, to
determine whether they are prudent expenditures.
State PUC's must adopt a procedure for funding decommissioning
costs. The preferred method will reflect estimated decommissioning
costs in the rates of current ratepayers so that those who benefit from
current nuclear powered electricity pay for all the costs of providing it.
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The Price-Anderson Act92 limits the total liability exposure of the
nuclear industry for any catastrophic accident to the greater of $560
million or the total insurance fund provided by the industry.93 Each
licensee is required to maintain the maximum level of insurance ac-
quirable from the private sources, which amounted to a total of $140
million in 1977.94 In addition, each licensee is subject to paying up to
five million dollars in deferred premiums to cover any damages exceed-
ing the primary level of insurance provided by the insurance industry.95
The Price-Anderson Act also provides that any person suffering an in-
jury caused by a nuclear accident may file a claim within three years
from the time he knew, or reasonably should have known, of this injury
and its cause, provided that the claim is filed within twenty years of the
nuclear accident which caused his injury.96
The effect of the Price-Anderson Act is to keep the nuclear indus-
try's exposure to tort liability within acceptable financial limits. 97 It
does, however, also subject each individual utility to liabilities arising
out of accidents for which that utility was not responsible. Thus, a util-
ity may be subject to an assessment of up to five million dollars because
of the malfunctioning of another utility's nuclear powerplant.
While the potential exposure to liability is large, the history of the
nuclear industry suggests that the chances of a utility being forced to
contribute an accident liability assessment are very small. In fact, until
the recent Three Mile Island disaster only about $600,000 in liability
claims have been paid.98 Moreover, it must be pointed out that the
assessments against individual utilities are not made until the primary
level of insurance is exhausted. 99 This fund totalled in excess of $140
million prior to Three Mile Island.100
As of April 10, 1979, only $650,000 had been paid for losses in-
curred by the victims of Three Mile Island, and that amount was
92. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Amendment, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576, (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1957).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1957).
94. NUCLEAR POWER CosTs, supra note 7, at 46.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (Supp. 1979).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1)(iii) (Supp. 1979).
97. NUCLEAR POWER CosTS, supra note 7, at 45-46.
98. Id. at 106 (minority views of Reps. Horton, Erlenborn, Wydler, C. Brown, McCloskey,
G. Brown, Thone, Kasten, Kindness, Corcoran, Quayle, Walker, Strangeland, and Cunningham).
99. See id. at 46.
100. Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
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mostly to cover the out-of-pocket expenses of their evacuation. 10'
Whether the total amount of liability associated with the Three Mile
Island accident will force contributions from other utilities depends on
the success of potential litigants claiming business losses which resulted
from the accident. 10 2 If other utilities eventually are assessed for Three
Mile Island damages, this will be the only such assessment made dur-
ing the industry's operating history. The effect on ratepayer's of liabil-
ity claims arising out of nuclear accidents is, therefore, likely to be
miniscule over the operating life of the average nuclear plant.
H. Conclusion
A nuclear power plant is a prudent investment in relation to other
types of plants if its higher capital costs can be offset by its lower oper-
ating costs. Key issues affecting the level of capital costs include the
relationship of the proposed nuclear plant's maximum capacity to the
utility system's current generation mix and projected firm demand and
load factor; its level of reserve capacity that must be added to the utility
system along with the nuclear plant; and the likelihood that the addi-
tion of a nuclear plant will force the state PUC to grant the utility Con-
struction Work in Progress. Issues affecting the plant's operating costs
are the level of nuclear fuel costs, the level of "crud" cleansing ex-
penses that must be incurred, the level of nuclear fuel disposal costs,
the level of decommissioning costs, and the effect on rates of potential
tort liability arising out of catastrophic nuclear mishaps.
To be effective in protecting ratepayers from imprudent invest-
ments in power plants, state PUC's should hold hearings at the earliest
point in time they can exert jurisdiction over plant construction projects
to determine with respect to capital cost issues:
1. Whether, throughout its useful life, the maximum capac-
ity of the proposed baseload nuclear plant approximates the
firm demand that will be placed on the system it will serve;
2. whether, given the utility system's current generation mix,
an addition of a baseload nuclear plant will prematurely re-
place or reduce the operation of existing plants and lower effi-
ciency of the system; and
3. the effects of future system demands and load factors of
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fired by natural gas, load management programs, and changes
in rate structures improved end-use efficiency
4. whether periodic review of the factors listed in 3. (above)
necessitates a revision in the utility system's generation expan-
sion plans;
5. whether adding a baseload nuclear plant to the utility sys-
tem will increase the utility system's required reserve capacity
to uneconomic levels; and
6. whether adding a baseload nuclear plant to the utility sys-
tem will force the state PUC to grant Construction Work in
Progress.
With respect to operating cost issues:
1. Whether uranium prices are rising so much faster than
the prices of alternative fuels that nuclear plants can no
longer offset enough of their higher capital costs with their
lower fuel costs to remain competitive with other types of
plants; and whether the fuel supply availability is better for
nuclear plants than other types of power plants. In this re-
gard, a reversal of the federal government's negative attitude
towards fuel reprocessing and breeder reactors would dramat-
ically improve the nuclear fuel supply outlook;
2. whether the proposed nuclear plant has an acceptable op-
erating reliability factor when compared to the operating reli-
ability factors of other types of plants; and whether the utility
has made contingent fuel purchase arrangements in case
power must be acquired to replace that lost as a result of a
power plant outage, and what costs will be borne by the rate-
payers under the terms of the utility's purchased power ar-
rangements and purchased power clauses;
3. whether a "crud" clean-up will be required in proposed
nuclear plants, and if so, what additional costs will be im-
posed on ratepayers;
4. what are the utility's plans for disposing of nuclear waste
and what projected costs these plans will impose on the rate-
payers are;
5. decommission costs, particularly what the utility's decom-
missioning strategy is and whether it is the optimum decom-
mission strategy when compared to alternative decommission
strategies; whether the costs of the optimum decommissioning
strategy are large enough to make the nuclear powerplant an
imprudent investment; and what procedure should be
adopted for funding expected decommissioning costs; and
6. what the effects on the ratepayers of potential tort liability
[Vol. 15:262
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arising from catastrophic nuclear accidents at any nuclear fa-
cility licensed by the NRC will be.
III. PROTECTING RATEPAYERS FROM IMPRUDENT UTILITY
INVESTMENTS
The procedures legally available to PUC's for protecting ratepay-
ers from imprudent utility investments are awkward and largely inef-
fective. The problem stems from the contradictory legal mandate that
PUC's protect ratepayers from bearing the burdens of unnecessary util-
ity expenditures without encroaching on the utilities' management
function.
A. The Regulatory Dilemma
Historically, monitoring demands for electric services within their
service areas and planning construction programs to meet them have
been considered utility management functions. 0 3 This permits utilities
to acquire, free from PUC regulatory control, the services, materials,
and land rights necessary for designing and obtaining regulatory ap-
proval of future power plants. It is only when the utility is actually
ready to begin physical construction at a chosen plant site that the PUC
gains regulatory jurisdiction over the construction project."° In some
states, including Oklahoma, the PUC has no control over utility con-
struction activities until the utility seeks to have the construction costs
reflected in its rates.105
Once a utility commission gains jurisdiction over a construction
project, it is not permitted to be an armchair quarterback and judge the
propriety of the project solely with hindsight. The commission is re-
quired to put itself into the place of the utility's managers and deter-
mine whether their decisions were reasonable in light of the
circumstances prevailing at the time they were made. 10 6 In other
words, the commission must decide whether the utility's managers ac-
103. See generally Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 543 P.2d 546 (Okla.
1975); Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 34, 42 (Chairman Cicchetti, dissenting);
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. CA-5491 at 8-13 (Oct. 18, 1974);
id. at 24 (Comm'r Padrutt, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
104. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 103, at 9-10; People's Counsel v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 259 Md. 409, -, 270 A.2d 105, 108 (1970).
105. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 543 P.2d 546, 549-52 (Okla. 1975).
106. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 232 Wis. 274, -, 287 N.W. 122, 158, 167
(1939); Waukesha Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 181 Wis. 281, 301, 194 N.W. 846, 854
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ted as reasonably prudent managers with respect to all expenditures
made to further proposed construction projects. Because it is extremely
difficult to recreate for present commissioners, possessing knowledge
about the current state of technology and the economy, the identical
circumstances faced by utility managers at the time they made their
decisions, this standard is a hard one to apply.
Obviously, many funds can be spent and committed in furtherance
of a utility construction project before it is ever subjected to PUC scru-
tiny. When capital-intensive projects are involved, such as nuclear
plants, the sunk costs can be so astronomical that they render illusory
the PUC's ability to protect ratepayers from imprudent investments. 10 7
If a significant amount of the utility expenditures are found to be im-
prudent, and therefore not subject to recovery from electric rates, the
loss to the utility's shareholders will soon be reflected in the capital
markets in the form of higher capital costs, which are imposed on the
ratepayer ultimately. 108
B. The Wisconsin Solution
It is difficult to solve the regulatory dilemma of how to protect
ratepayers from imprudent investments. If PUC's review every trans-
action associated with planning, designing, and seeking regulatory ap-
proval of a power plant, the resulting delay in constructing the plant
could dramatically increase its cost.'0 9 Moreover, the transactions
would be so numerous that the PUC could suffer an administrative
breakdown."10 It is, therefore, not worthwhile to give PUC's approvai
authority over every pre-construction expenditure.
Wisconsin has developed a workable compromise between illusory
control and total control over pre-construction expenditure. By statute,
the utilities are required to submit advanced planning programs to the
Wisconsin Public Service Commission for its approval. I The proce-
dure compels utilities to forecast future coincident and noncoincident
demands and future energy usage, and submit system generation con-
struction plans tailored to meet their forecasts." 2 The utilities system
107. See Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 43, at 23-24 (Comm'r Parsons, concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
108. Id.
109. See Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 103, at 19, 22 (Chairman Eich, concurring),
110. Id. at 11.
111. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.491 (West Supp. 1979).
112. Id. at § 196.491(2)(a), which provides:
On or before July 1 of each even-numbered year, or such other biennial period as the
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generation construction plans must contain discussions of system gen-
eration and plant site alternatives, and an analysis of why those se-
lected were superior to the alternatives." 3
Copies of the utility's advanced plan are submitted to each Wis-
consin state regulatory agency which will exercise regulatory authority
over proposed construction projects." 4 Copies of the advanced plan
are sent also to all affected local governments and are made available
commission may approve, each electric utility shall file its plan with the commission and
with those persons or agencies listed in par. (b). Such plans may be appropriate portions
of a single regional plan or may be prepared jointly by 2 or more utilities, and shall:
1. Describe the general location, size and type of facilities which are expected to be
owned or operated in whole or in part by such utility and the construction of which is
expected to commence during the ensuing 10 years, or such longer period as the commis-
sion deems necessary, and shall identify all existing facilities intended to be removed
from service during such period or upon completion of such construction;
2. Identify practical alternates to the general location, fuel type and method of
generation of the proposed electric generating facilities, and set forth in detail the rea-
sons for selecting the proposed general location, fuel type and method of generation;
3. Identify the location of proposed and alternative specific sites for all bulk elec-
tric generating facilities and all large electric generating facilities over 200,000 kilowatts
for which a certificate of public convenience and necessity has not been applied for
under sub. (3) but the commencement of whose construction is planned within 3 years,
or such longer period as the commission deems necessary and indicate the impacts of the
proposed and alternative generating facilities on the environment and the means by
which potential adverse effects on such values will be avoided or minimized;
3m. Identify the location of tentative and alternative routes for high voltage trans-
mission lines on which construction is intended to be commenced in the succeeding 18
months and indicate the effect of such transmission lines on the environment and the
means by which potential adverse effects will be avoided or minimized;
4. Indicate in detail the projected demand for electric energy and the basis for
determining the projected demand;
5. Describe the utility's relationship to other utilities and regional associations,
power pools and networks;
6. Identify and describe all major research projects and programs which will con-
tinue or commence in the succeeding three years and set forth the reasons for selecting
specific areas for research;
7. Identify and describe existing and planned programs and policies to discourage
inefficient and excessive power use; and
8. Provide any other information required by the commission.
(am) No local ordinance may prohibit or restrict testing activities undertaken by a
utility for purposes of preparing advance plans or determining the suitability of a site for
the placement of a facility. Any local unit of government objecting to such testing may
petition the commission to impose reasonable restrictions on such activity.
In Wisconsin's Public Service Commission's first advance plan order, the Commission stated that
"[Qor future advance plans, the commission will require both coincident forecasts for each plan-
ning group, and the group's planned response to demand growth which is either higher or lower
than forecasted." Advance Plans for Construction, supra note 7, at 5.
113. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.491(2)(a) (West Supp. 1979) see note 112 supra.
114. Id. at § 196.491(2)(b) (West Supp. 1979) provides:
26
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss2/5
TULSA LAW JOURNVAL [Vol. 15:262
to the public through the local library." 5 Each affected agency must
prepare comments detailing what administrative authority it has over
any proposed construction project, what tasks the utility must under-
take to obtain the agency's approval of the project, and an assessment
of the likelihood that the proposed project will obtain its approval." t6
The Wisconsin procedure provides many advantages over other
procedures for protecting ratepayers from excessive power plant con-
struction costs. First, the procedure forces utilities to consider the mer-
its of several alternative courses of action before they pursue any
particular construction plan. Thus, utility managers must adopt deci-
sionmaking mechanisms similar to those which the discipline of com-
petition impose on businesses within competitive industries.
Second, the PUC judges the actions of the utility manager contem-
poraneously rather than retrospectively years hence. The contempora-
neous review should make it easier for commissioners to understand all
of the variables available for the utility managers' decisions, and obvi-
A copy of each advance plan shall, at the time it is filed with the commission, also be
filed with each of the following:
1. Department of administration.
2. Department of business development.
3. Department of health and social services.
4. Department of justice.
5. Department of local affairs and development.
6. Department of natural resources.
7. Department of transportation.
8. The director or chairman of each regional planning commission constituted
under s. 66.945 which has jurisdiction over any area where a facility is proposed to be
located or which requests a copy of such plan.
115. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.491(2)(d) (West Supp. 1979) provides:
The commission shall, within 10 days after the plan is filed, send a copy of such plan, or
the appliable portion thereof, to the county planner, or, if none exists, to the county
cleark of each county affected by the plan, to the main public library of each such
county, and to any other county planner, county clerk or public library which requests
copies of such plans or portions of plans. The commission shall send a copy of the
applicable portion of the plan to the clerk of each municipality and town in which a bulk
or large electric generating facility is proposed to be located, and shall notify each public
library in such municipality or town that copies of the plan are available upon request.
116. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.491(2)(c) (West Supp. 1979) provides:
Those agencies receiving copies under par. (b) shall review the plans and submit their
comments to the commission within 180 days after their receipt of the plans. Comments
shall include:
1. A description of any statutory permits or approvals required by the agency.
2. A description of the types and forms of information required for adequate re-
view of an application for each permit or approval.
3. A detailed discussion as to the areas in which the plans coordinate with the
agency's plans, policies, functions and programs and the areas in which the plans conflict
and the significance of such conflicts.
4. To the extent practicable and consistent with its program responsibilities, a dis-
cussion of the environmental impacts of the plan.
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ate the necessity to identify the relevant variables through the dim light
of history.
Third, the Wisconsin procedure does not require the PUC to con-
sider every pre-construction activity the utility will engage in on a
piecemeal basis. Only major contracts for pre-construction services or
materials must be reported to the commissioner. 1 17 Once a construc-
tion project has been approved, the utility can be confident that pre-
construction expenses it incurs will be deemed prudent unless they vio-
late other legal prohibitions.
Fourth, any delay in construction which results from the tasks re-
quired in submitting an advanced plan may be offset by reducing the
time it takes to surmount other regulatory barriers. This benefit is de-
rived from the requirement that all affected government agencies are to
be informed of the plan; and they, in turn, are required to provide in-
formation with which to coordinate the policies of all affected regula-
tory agencies with the construction needs of the utility." 8 The
information provided by the affected regulatory agencies can also pro-
vide the PUC with an understanding of what expenditures are abso-
lutely necessary for the utility to make before its construction program
will clear all mandatory regulatory hurdles.
Finally, and most importantly, the Wisconsin procedure gives
PUC's a meaningful opportunity to prevent large sums from being ex-
pended on construction projects which are inappropriate in relation to
the utility's demand conditions and present generation mix, or which
are totally inconsistent with the goals and policies of a regulatory
agency with authority to kill the project. This benefit can save the rate-
payers or shareholders the millions of dollars in losses that result when-
ever a nuclear plant is either stopped at the construction or operation
stage, or is put into service despite being inappropriate to the needs of
the utility's service area." 9
117. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196A91(2)(m) (West Supp. 1979) provides:
Any major contract relating to a facility for which a certificate of public convenience and
necessity has not been applied for under sub. (3), other than a contract relating to acqui-
sition of real property, shall be reported in writing to the commission, indicating the
general nature and amount of that commitment, within 30 days after it has been entered
into.
118. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.491(2)(c) (West Supp. 1979). See note 116 supra.
119. Recently the Wisconsin Public Service Commission denied a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity to commence construction of a nuclear powerplant at the Tyrone Energy Park.
Northern States Power Co., supra note 12, at 17. In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Oes-
treicher noted that "[a]fter nine years of planning, development, jumping through regulatory
1979]
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IV. OKLAHOMA'S RATEPAYER PROTECTION MECHANISMS
Unlike other states, Oklahoma does not require its electric utilities
to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity before com-
mencing construction of utility facilities. 12° While the Corporation
Commission is given broad regulatory jurisdiction over the rates and
practices of electric utilities,' 21 the legislature declined to establish spe-
cifically a construction certificate procedure for electric utilities as it did
for other types of utilities regulated by the Corporation Commission. 22
As a consequence, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled:
The Constitution simply does not confer upon the Cor-
poration Commission, either expressly or by necessary impli-
cation, the power to regulate, supervise and control the
internal management and control of a public utility to the ex-
tent that it may prohibit the construction of /a] proposed pro-
ject ..... 123
Similarly, with respect to imprudent non-capital expenditures, the
court has stated:
The powers of the Commission are to regulate, supervise,
and control the public service companies in their services and
rates, but these powers do not extend to an invasion of the
discretion vested in the corporate management. It does not
include the power to approve or disapprove contracts about to
be entered into nor to approve or veto the expenditures pro-
posed. 124
The Corporation Commission, however, is not powerless with re-
spect to protecting ratepayers from imprudent investments and expend-
itures. It may exclude all imprudent costs from the utilities' allowable
revenues, thereby preventing these excessive costs from being passed on
to the ratepayers. The seminal case in this area is Lone Star Gas Co. v.
hoops and 60 million dollars expended, the majority is telling the applicants, "Sorry, it's too big".
Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
120. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 543 P.2d 546, 549-52 (Okla. 1975).
See Lone Star Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 170 Okla. 292, 297-98, 39 P.2d 547, 553-54 (1934)
(reh. denied 1934; appeal to file second pet. for reh. denied, 1935).
121. See OKLA. CoNsT. art. 9, § 18; OKLA. STAT., tit. 17 §§ 152 (1971).
122. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 543 P.2d 546, 548-49 (Okla. 1975).
The legislature has conferred upon the Commission the authority to certify the construction of
cotton gins, OKLA. STAT., tit. 17, § 43 (1971); water transportation lines, OKLA. STAT., tit. 17,
§ 159.12 (1971); and radio common carriers, OKLA. STAT., tit. 17, § 202 (1971).
123. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 543 P.2d 546, 552 (Okla. 1975)
(emphasis added).
124. Lone Star Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 170 Okla. 292, 297, 39 P.2d 547, 553 (1934)
relk denied 1934; appeal to file secondpet for reh. denied, 1935.
[Vol. 15:262
29
Allison: Judging the Prudence of Constructing Nuclear Power Plants: A Repo
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1979
POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION
Corporation Commission125 wherein the court ruled:
The powers of the Commission, as respects the acts of public
service companies, are limited to an investigation of these acts
to determine whether or not they have a reasonable and fair
effect upon the rights of the public and to take steps to avoid
an unreasonable or unfair or prejudicial effect upon the pub-
lic rights . . 126
As an example, the court cited a Kansas case wherein the utility was
prohibited from setting up in its books an expense item over a certain
fixed sum for any payments made to a certain individual because the
commission had ruled such payments to be excessive. In approving the
Kansas commission's handling of the matter, the court stated:
This was not an attempt to order the distributor not to
pay such sums of money, but rather was an order not to
charge, as an item of expense, a sum in excess of the figure
found to be the reasonable cost of gas. . . This is a distinc-
tion of vital importance in rate making. The rate-making
body makes calculations entering into a rate base designed to
produce an adequate return. What the company does with its
income is of no concern to the rate-making body, so long as a
full and complete disclosure thereof is made when called for
in order that its effect under all of the circumstances may be
judged properly.'27
In other words, the Corporation Commission cannot stop a utility
from making imprudent expenditures, capital or non-capital, but can
prevent these expenditures from being passed on to the ratepayers and
can thereby impose upon the utilities the burden of their own follies.
Thus, it is clear that the Commission can exercise control over impru-
dent construction projects during revenue and rate-making proceed-
ings, by excluding the costs of such projects from its revenue
calculations.
Deferring control over imprudent construction projects until the
utility seeks to have them reflected in its allowable revenue may be an
illusory mechanism for protecting ratepayers. If the imprudent ex-
penditures are large, as with nuclear plants, imposing the financial bur-
dens on the stockholders may simply drive up the utility's cost of
capital, which eventually is passed on to the ratepayers. It is desirable,
125. Id.
126. Id. at 297, 39 P.2d at 553.
127. Id. at 298, 39 P.2d at 554.
1979]
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therefore, for the Commission to assert its powers to discourage impru-
dent utility construction before such construction is completed. Court
interpretation of the Commission's constitutional and statutory powers
affords several alternatives for discouraging imprudent investments
before the utility seeks to have them entered into its rate base, includ-
ing the use of rulemaking to examine categories of expenditures and by
rule exclude those found to be inherently imprudent or improper; the
use of Oklahoma's utility securities certification procedure to deny a
certificate authorizing the issuance of securities to utilities seeking
financing of projects found to be imprudent by the Commission; or the
use of Construction Work in Progress as an incentive to utilities to
comply with an advanced planning procedure like Wisconsin's.
A. Rulemaking
In State v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. ,"'8 the Commission had
adopted roles which prohibited contributions to charitable, religious,
educational, civic, community, social, or public welfare associations,
institutions, or organizations, and payments to cities and towns in ex-
cess of franchise taxes or charges which utilities must pay pursuant to
enforceable written contracts or franchises, from being included in op-
erating expenses. The Commission prohibited the utilities from mak-
ing expenditures in furtherance of a variety of promotional and
advertising practices.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained the Commission with re-
spect to the exclusion of gift expenditures, but reversed the Commis-
sion's prohibitions of advertising and promotional expenses. 129 In
reversing the Commission's ban on advertising and promotional ex-
penses, the court reiterated its earlier holding in Lone Star that the
Commission could exclude improper expenses from the rate calcula-
tion, but could not prevent utilities from making any expense they were
willing to finance without ratepayer contributions. 130 The court also
found that some of the promotional expenses complained of were not
inherently improper, and therefore had to be judged on their individual
merits, not excluded as a class.13 1
The State v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. case clearly permits
128. 536 P.2d 887, 891-95 (Okla. 1975).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 894.
131. Id. at 894, 896.
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the Commission to consider whether any generic class of expenses is
imprudent, and if so, to exclude them as a class from future ratemaking
calculations. If the Commission so desires, it can hold hearings to con-
sider whether expenses associated with developing nuclear plants are
imprudent and therefore subject to exclusion in whole or in part from
the rates of the developing utilities. Nuclear plant development ex-
penditures made prior to the adoption of the rule cannot be subject to
exclusion from the developing utilities' rates unless it can be demon-
strated that at the time they were made, the developing utilities knew or
should have known of the imprudence of nuclear plant development,
or unless these sums are otherwise excludable because they are exces-
sive, unwarranted, unreasonable, or were made in bad faith.' 31
This type of rulemaking with respect to nuclear power plants fails
to accommodate change in economic and technological conditions. It
is, therefore, impossible to state that the development of nuclear power
plants will always be an imprudent or improper utility activity like the
gift expenditures disapproved in State v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric
Co. Therefore, utilities which gamble that conditions will change, and
develop nuclear plants in spite of the rule excluding such development
costs from rate calculations, will have the right to demonstrate in their
first rate hearings after their nuclear plants are ready to go into opera-
tion that changed conditions now make nuclear plants prudent invest-
ments for ratemaking purposes.' 33 Moreover, if the power plant is
actually put into service, the utility has the right to have at least part of
its cost put into the rate base as equipment used and useful.' 34
132. Id. at 896. Wisconsin, however, has recently ruled that the expenses associated with de-
veloping a nuclear power plant that was denied regulatory approval could be imposed on the
utility, notwithstanding the utility's prudence in incurring such expenses, when such expenses no
longer had value to the utility or its customers by virtue of no longer furthering the denied project,
or any similar project. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 43, at 7-9. In his concurring opin-
ion, Chairman Cicchetti offered the rationale that all pre-certification expenses represented risks
that companies, regulated or unregulated, must bear in an uncertain world, and that such risks
were reflected in the utility's rate of return. Id. at 13-14.
133. See State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887, 897 (Okla. 1975). This does not
mean that rulemaking offers nothing as a methodology for controlling imprudent nuclear power-
plant expenses. The Commission might find it inherently inappropriate to ask ratepayers to bear
all pre-certification costs of nuclear projects which have been denied regulatory approval. See
note 132 supra. It would be fair to rule as to who should bear the costs arising from nuclear
accidents caused by utility operational negligence or mismanagement. In Pennsylvania, the state
of utility regulation law apparently will impose significant costs on the ratepayers to clean up the
Three Mile Island powerplant and to purchase power to cover the power lost due to Three Mile
Island's complete shutdown. Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1979, at I, col. 4.
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B. Certifying the Issuance of Utlly Securities
A more promising procedure for discouraging imprudent utility
investments is Oklahoma's procedure requiring utilities to obtain a cer-
tificate of authorization from the Corporation Commission before they
may issue their securities. The statutory basis for this proceeding
states:
A public utility organized under the laws of this State may,
when authorized by order of the Commission, and not other-
wise, issue securities when necessary for the acquisition of
property, the construction, extension or improvement of itsfacil-
ities, or the improvement of its service, orfor the discharge or
lawful refunding of its obligations, or reimbursement of moneys
actually expended from income from any source, or for any
other corporate purpose authorized by the Commission.. 13'
There is no Oklahoma case law interpreting the scope of the Com-
mission's authority to certify utility security issues. The boundaries of
the Commission's securities certification powers, however, are sug-
gested by the language of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, 36
and case law interpretation of similar statutory powers possessed by the
Michigan Public Service Commission.137
Congress expressed its concern over the necessity for controlling
utility holding companies by stating:
[T]he national public interest, the interest of investors in the
securities of holding companies and their subsidiary compa-
nies and affiliates, and the interest of consumers of electric
energy and natural and manufactured gas, are or may be ad-
versely affected-
(1) when such investors cannot obtain the information
necessary to appraise the financial position or earning power
of the issuers, because of the absence of uniform standard ac-
counts; when such securities are issued without the approval
or consent of the States having jurisdiction over subsidiary
public-utility companies; when such securities are issued upon
the basis of fictitious or unsound asset values having no fair
relation to the sums invested in or the earning capacity of the
properties and upon the basis of paper profits from intercom-
pany transactions, or in anticipation of excessive revenues
from subsidiary public-utility companies; when such securi-
135. OKLA. STAT., tit. 17, § 184 (1971) (emphasis added).
136. Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, § 33, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935).
137. See note 140 infra and accompanying text.
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ties are issued by a subsidiary public-utility company under
circumstances which subject such company to the burden of
supporting an overcapitalized structure and tend to prevent
voluntary rate reductions;
(2) when subsidiary public-utility companies are sub-
jected to excessive charges for services, construction work,
equipment, and materials, or enter into transactions in which
evils result from an absence of arm's-length bargaining or
from restraint of free and independent competition; when
service, management, construction, and other contracts in-
volve the allocation of charges among subsidiary public-util-
ity companies in different States so as to present problems of
regulation which cannot be dealt with effectively by the
States;
(3) when control of subsidiary public-utility companies
affects the accounting practices and rate, dividend, and other
policies of such companies so as to complicate and obstruct
State regulation of such companies, or when control of such
companies is exerted through disproportionately small invest-
ment;
(4) when the growth and extension of holding compa-
nies bears no relation to economy of management and opera-
tion or the integration and coordination of related operating
properties; or
(5) when in any other aspect there is lack of economy of
management and operation of public-utility companies or
lack of efficiency and adequacy of service rendered by such
companies, or lack of effective public regulation, or lack of
economies in the raising of capital. 138
This Congressional declaration recognizes the sensitive relation-
ship between the utility's capital structure and its rates, and how lack of
control over the former can destroy regulation of the latter. Specifi-
cally, the concern is the prevention of over-capitalization, which can
occur whenever the utility uses the proceeds of security issues to make
imprudent, excessive, unwarranted, or unreasonable expenditures.
Overcapitalization reduces the soundness of the security holder's in-
vestment because the company's income may not cover enough capital
costs to pay a reasonable dividend. Where utilities are concerned, the
security holders are insulated from the overcapitalization problem
when PUC's pass on the costs of imprudent investments to the ratepay-
138. 15 U.S.C. § 79a.(b) (1970).
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ers, thus assuring that the company has enough income to keep its in-
vestors happy. Even when the PUC places the burden of an imprudent
investment on the security holders, the ratepayer will still lose if the
burden is large enough to have a significant effect on security holders'
investments because future investors will regard the company's securi-
ties as riskier than before and will demand higher returns on their in-
vestments. 139
In Michigan, which confers upon its Public Service Commission
powers to regulate the issuance of utility securities by statutory lan-
guage almost identical to the Oklahoma Statutes conferring such pow-
ers on the Corporation Commission, 140 the courts have recognized the
interrelationships of securities regulation and ratepayer protection. In
Michigan Gas Storage Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission,'41
the Michigan Supreme Court said:
[P]roper evaluation of a proposed offering of securities
will also affirmatively take into account the interests of the
customers of the utilities, the ratepayers, as directed by stat-
ute. Proper securities regulation serves the interests of the
ratepayers in assuring continued service without interruption
from utilities and in receiving that service at reasonable
rates. 14
2
139. See Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 43 at 23-24 (Comm'r Parsons, concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
140. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 460.301 (1979 Supp.) (amending MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 460.301 (1915)). Section 1 provides:
A corporation or association except a municipal corporation, organized or authorized to
do business under the laws of this state, or a lessee or trustee thereof, a person owning,
conducting, managing, operating, or controlling a plant or equipment within this state
used wholly or in part in the business of transmitting messages by telephone or tele-
graph, producing or furnishing heat, artificial gas, light, water, or mechanical power to
the public, directly or indirectly, a railroad, interurban railroad, or other common car-
rier, or a corporation, association, or individual exercising or claiming the right to carry
or transport natural gas for public use, directly or indirectly, or petroleum oil by or
through pipeline or pipelines or engaged in the business of piping or transporting natural
gas for public use, directly or indirectly, or engaged in the business of purchasing natural
gas for distribution may issue stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness
payable at periods of more than 12 months after the date thereof, when necessary for the
acquisition of property, the construction, completion, extension, or improvement of facil-
ities or for the improvement or maintenance of service or for the discharge or lawful
refunding of obligations and may issue stock to represent accumulated earnings invested
in capital assets and not previously capitalized, if the public service commission issues an
order authorizing the issue and the amount thereof, and states that in the opinion of the
commission the use of the capital or property to be acquired to be secured by the issue of
the stock, bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness, is reasonably required for the
purposes of the person, corporation, or association, or that the issue of the stock fairly
represents accumulated and undistributed earnings invested in capital assets and not pre-
viously capitalized. Approval of securities does not presume that the projects to be con-
structed or property to be acquired will be included in the company's rate base.
141. 405 Mich. 376, 275 N.W.2d 457 (1979).
142. Id. at _ 275 N.W.2d at 462 (emphasis added).
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The Michigan Public Service Commission uses its powers to cer-
tify utility security issues to inquire into the prudence of the expendi-
tures to be financed from the proceeds. One opinion illustrates the
process.' 43 In this case, Detroit Edison Company filed an application
to issue $513 million in securities, and designated several construction
projects which would be financed by the issues. The Commission held
hearings on the application to take evidence from several intervenors,
including Michigan's Attorney General, on the need for each project.
The evidence consisted of demand and load forecasts and the compara-
tive economics of alternative types of powerplants, all for the purpose
of determining whether each project was a necessary or prudent invest-
ment. 144 Although the Commission granted Detroit Edison's applica-
tion in its entirety, it did so only after deciding that the record of the
hearings established a need for all the projects to be financed by the
certified security issues.'
The lesson of the Michigan experience, in the context of the tradi-
tional purposes of the regulation of utility securities, is that the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission can use its securities regulation
authority to compel utilities to demonstrate a need for the projects for
which they seek outside funding. The Commission should require the
utilities to demonstrate a need for each construction project contained
in their applications for security issues certification. The proceeding
should look into all of the issues previously designated as relevant to
the prudence of alternative powerplants.
C. CWIP Incentives
The mechanisms suggested here for controlling imprudent utility
investments have a major drawback in that the utilities may make large
expenditures before the investments are subject to Commission scru-
tiny. Because the Commission lacks authority to prohibit construction
projects, it cannot implement an advanced planning mechanism like
Wisconsin's which prohibits development of projects not contained in
an approved construction program. The Commission can, however,
use its discretion in permitting Construction Work in Progress to con-
fine its allowance solely to utilities which submit and agree to imple-
143. Detroit Edison Co., Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. U-5877 (Apr. 17, 1979).
144. Id. at 3-9.
145. Id. at 10-14, 16-17.
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ment an advanced plan to govern their system generation construction
programs. This mechanism should survive legal attack, since the Com-
mission would not be prohibiting the utilities from any construction. If
utilities submit advanced plans and then build projects not included in
their advanced plans, their rights to Construction Work in Progress
could be terminated and the Commission could order a refund of the
financial benefits the utilities had already received. Although current
ratepayers would initially pay higher capital costs under this mecha-
nism, they would benefit from a program with the potential of prevent-
ing imprudent expenditures rather than just excluding them from the
utilities' rate calculations.
V. CONCLUSION
Significant issues must be explored before utilities undertake to
develop new power plants. Whether the nuclear option is prudent de-
pends upon the conditions faced by the utility at the time it makes its
decision. Given the enormous costs involved, it is crucial that public
utility commissions develop procedures with which to monitor utilities'
construction programs so that ratepayers will not be saddled with the
burdens of inefficient or inappropriate electric generation systems.
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